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KOREA AND THE AMERICAN GENERALIZED SYSTEM
OF PREFERENCES: WAS GRADUATION A PROPER
RESPONSE?
JAY S. NEWMAN*
To the Congress of the United States:
I am writing concerning the Generalized System of
Preferences (GSP) and Hong Kong, the Republic of Korea,
Singapore, and Taiwan. The GSP program is authorized by
the Trade Act of 1974, as amended ("the Act").
I am hereby providing notice of my intent to remove
Hong Kong, the Republic of Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan
from their status as beneficiaries of the GSP program as of
January 2, 1989, under Section 504(a)(1) of the Act (19
U.S.C. 2464(a)(1)). All four have achieved an impressive
level of economic development and competitiveness, which
can be sustained without the preferences provided by the
program. Graduating these economies may also enable other
less developed countries to benefit more fully from the GSP
program.
Ronald Reagan.
THE WHITE HOUSE, January 29, 1988.'
President Reagan's declaration to remove South Korea and three
other Asian nations, often called NIC's (Newly Industrialized Coun-
tries), from the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) is an impor-
tant step for their entrance into the world's economic system. South
Korea's "graduation" from this program is a milestone in its economic
development. Its recent growth has catapulted the nation out of the
ranks of the "developing" countries. This article will examine the his-
torical significance of the GSP concept, its development, its purpose,
and its implementation as illustrated by the American program. It will
focus upon the events leading up to the graduation of South Korea from
the American GSP and analyze the impact that this event will have
* J.D. Candidate 1990, University of Pennsylvania Law School; B.A. 1987,
Brandeis University.
I H.R. Doc. No. 162, 100th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1988) [hereinafter MESSAGE:
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upon Korea, various actors in the United States and other affected par-
ties. The costs and benefits of "graduation" will be addressed with
these considerations in mind. This comment will also discuss whether
the graduation of countries such as South Korea are in the best inter-
ests of the graduating country, the benefit-providing nation and the in-
ternational economy. There are no easy answers. This comment hopes
to stimulate further critical analysis of the GSP as well as the general
issues of international trade and international relations.
1. THE CONCEPT OF A GENERALIZED SYSTEM OF PREFERENCES
The concept of unilateral trade preferences2 given to developing
nations can be traced to Principle Eight of the United Nations Confer-
ence on Trade and Development of 1964 (UNCTAD I).' This princi-
ple declares that "[d]eveloped countries should grant concessions to all
developing countries and extend to developing countries all concessions
they grant to one another and should not, in granting these or other
concessions, require any concessions from developing countries."4 The
developed countries, including the United States, were not prepared to
accept such a sweeping doctrine: "Almost all the developing countries
and the socialist countries voted in favor [of the Principle], but the de-
veloped market-economy countries either abstained or voted against
it."5 Opposition to this concept dissolved at UNCTAD 11,6 as devel-
oped and developing nations agreed that the idea of a preference system
based on Principle Eight should be considered and subsequently imple-
mented by each developed country. "Thus, the aim of the preferential
treatment of developing countries should be, according to the
Resolution:
a) to increase their export earnings;
2 The unilateral trade preferences utilized in the various GSP systems are the
reduction or elimination of tariffs. Tariffs create an artificially higher price for the
imported good. This effect, theoretically, decreases consumer demand for the good.
Thus, the tariff weakens the exporting nations' comparative advantages in producing
that good. See generally J. BARTON & B. FISHER, INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND IN-
VESTMENT: REGULATING INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 14 (1986).
' "The first session of this conference was convened in Geneva in conformity with
General Assembly resolution 1785 (XVII) of 8 December 1962 from 23 March to 16
June 1964." U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT, REPORT AND AN-
NEXES 3, U.N. Doc. TD/97, Vol. I, U.N. Sales No. E.68.II.D.14 (1968) [hereinafter
UNCTAD]. The second session of this conference, UNCTAD II, convened in New
Delhi from 1 February to 29 March 1968. Id.
4 A. YUSUF, LEGAL ASPECTS OF TRADE PREFERENCES FOR DEVELOPING
STATES: A STUDY IN THE INFLUENCE OF DEVELOPMENT NEEDS ON THE EVOLUTION
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 79 (1982).
5 Id. at 80.
8 See UNCTAD, supra note 3, at 1.
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b) to promote their industrialization;
c) to accelerate their rates of economic growth."' The developed
nations' change in position regarding Principle Eight can perhaps be
explained by the fact that the GSP was no longer seen as a threat to
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the Most-
Favored Nation (MFN) principle.'
The developed nations did not want the GATT principles ad-
versely affected. "The cornerstone of the GATT is the requirement
that tariff concessions should be granted on a MFN basis. The purpose
of the MFN clause is to confine arbitrary distortions in the flow of
international trade by discriminatory unilateral or bilateral measures." 9
Preferential trade benefits given to recipients without a subsequent
benefit given to the donor threatened the concept of MFN and multilat-
eral trade concessions. It was realized, however, that a limited granting
of preferential treatment would not be detrimental to the broader
agreement.
[T]he GSP should not be considered a major blow against
the spirit of GATT; a particular group of countries was
awarded preferential status according to the consensus of the
contracting parties in order to give the former easier access to
export markets, i.e., following trade liberalising motives with
a developmental policy orientation."
Furthermore, the GSP was strengthened in 197911 when "agreement
was reached in the MTN Framework Group on an enabling clause
which provides the legal basis for special and differential treatment for
developing nations."112 Acceptance of the enabling clause by the devel-
oped countries was obtained when developing nations, in turn, agreed
' YUSUF, supra note 4, at 82.
8 The concept of most-favored nation treatment states that any customs duties,
including tariffs in which any advantage is "granted by any contracting party to any
product originating in or destined for any other country shall be accorded immediately
and unconditionally to the like product originating in or destined for the territories of
all other contracting parties." General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947,
art.1, G1 Stat. (5),(6),T.I.A.S. No. 1700 at 8, 55 U.N.T.S. 194, 198.
9 Nicolaides, Preferences for Developing Countries: A Critique, J. WORLD
TRADE L. 373 (1985).
10 W. KRAUS & W. LUTKENHORST, THE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF THE
PACIFIC BASIN: GROWTH DYNAMICS, TRADE RELATIONS, AND EMERGING COOPERA-
TION 2 (1986).
1 Nicolaides, supra note 9, at 374-75.
1' HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 96TH CONG., 2ND SESS., REPORT TO
THE CONGRESS ON THE FIRST FIVE YEARS' OPERATION OF THE U.S. GENERALIZED
SYSTEM OF PREFERENCES (GSP) 3 (Comm. Print 1980) [hereinafter FIRST FIVE
YEARS' OPERATION].
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to a "graduation" principle which required an increase in their GATT
responsibilities as their economies grew and diversified.13 These con-
cepts and agreements are the foundation upon which the United States
has based its GSP program.
2. THE AMERICAN GSP AND THE TRADE ACT OF 1984
The concept of a Generalized System of Preferences received wide-
spread support following UNCTAD II. It was agreed that such pro-
grams would be implemented by individual governments, each with its
own requirements and limitations. The United States was the last de-
veloped nation to implement a Generalized System of Preferences be-
cause unlike other countries which implemented their schemes by "ad-
ministrative measures or by community regulations, . . . the United
States' scheme required implementing legislation."' 4 On January 3,
1975, the 1974 Trade Act' was adopted which included Title V-Gen-
eralized System of Preferences. In 1984, the Act was amended to its
current form by Pub. L. 98-573. This section will examine some of the
important changes which resulted from the recent amendment and their
impact upon the process of "graduation."
The United States Constitution, Art. I, § 8, cls. 1 and 3, grant the
power to "lay and collect duties" and to "regulate commerce" to Con-
gress and not to the Executive branch. Congress, however, has dele-
gated substantial amounts of power to regulate international commerce
to the Executive.' The GSP exemplifies this power relationship be-
tween Congress, which enacted the program, and the Executive, which
executes the program. The 1984 Amendment to the Trade Act added
an additional criterion that the President should examine when deter-
mining whether a country is eligible for duty-free treatment for a par-
ticular article under GSP. The three original criteria included the fol-
lowing: (1) the effect benefits would have on the developing country;
(2) the benefits granted by other developed nations through their GSP
programs; and (3) the impact on United States producers. The amend-
ment added the following paragraph: "(4) the extent of the beneficiary
I Id.
Y VUSUF, supra note 4, at 127.
15 Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, §§ 501-505, 88 Stat. 1978, 2066-71
(1974) (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. §§ 2461-2466 (1985)) [hereinafter 1974
Trade Act].
16 See generally United States v. Yoshida Int'l, Inc., 526 F. 2d 560 (C.C.P.A.
1975) (President has authority to impose a temporary surcharge on imports); Star-Kist
Foods, Inc. v. United States, 275 F.2d 472 (C.C.P.A. 1959) (emphasizing that Con-
gress limited the Presidential authority to modify duties strictly in accordance with the
purposes for which the Act was promulgated).
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developing country's competitiveness with respect to eligible articles."1
It is claimed that "[it] was added to § 501 of the 1974 Act to emphasize
Congressional desire for a more rigorous application of graduation
principles.""8 This provision authorizes a more thorough investigation
of each article receiving preferential treatment. Implicit in the increased
scrutiny towards individual goods is the greater likelihood that a partic-
ular product will be graduated once it obtains the requisite "competi-
tiveness." Congress has announced a number of more stringent provi-
sions regarding "article graduation" as well as the graduation of
countries from the program.
The 1974 Trade Act's discussion of graduation focused upon spe-
cific articles which would not be designated as eligible. 9 The 1984
Trade Act retained these provisions and also added other provisions
which restrict the eligibility of a nation's articles. According to §
505(a),
The President shall, as necessary, advise the Congress
and, by no later than January 4, 1988, submit to the Con-
gress a report on the application of sections 501 and 502(c),
and the actions the President has taken to withdraw, to sus-
pend, or to limit the application of duty-free treatment with
respect to any country which has failed to adequately take
the actions described in section 502(c).
2 0
The implementation of this section is vividly illustrated by the Reagan
message of January 29, 1988. This provision gave authority for the
graduation of Hong Kong, Korea, Singapore and Taiwan. Further-
more, the 1984 Act added a mandatory graduation provision:
If the President determines that the per capita gross na-
tional product (calculated on the basis of the best available
information, including that of the World Bank) of any bene-
ficiary developing country, for any calendar year . . . after
1984, exceeds the applicable limit for the determination year
... such country shall not be treated as a beneficiary devel-
oping country under this title .... .
' The 1984 Trade Act, Pub. L. No. 98-573, § 502, 98 Stat. 2948, 3018-19,
(1984) [hereinafter 1984 Trade Act].
"s Note, Renewal of the GSP: An Explanation of the Program and Changes
made by the 1984 Legislation, 18 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 625, 651 (1985) [herein-
after Renewal of the GSP].
19 See generally 1974 Trade Act, supra note 15, at §§ 503-504.
20 1984 Trade Act, supra note 17, at § 505(a)(2).
21 MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT, supra note 1.
22 1984 Trade Act, supra note 17, at § 505(c).
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The "applicable limit" according to § 505(c) is approximately $8,500."2
This limit is well above Korea's GDP of US$2361 as of 1986.4 Con-
gress' protectionist sentiment is demonstrated by these various provi-
sions: "The 1984 Act expanded the graduation concept [from removal
of products] to include the complete removal of countries from contin-
ued GSP eligibility for all their products."25 These changes in the pro-
gram are argued to be appropriate in light of the purpose and intent of
the concept of a Generalized System of Preferences.
The purpose of the American GSP is declared in § 501 of the
Generalized System of Preferences Renewal Act of 1984. There are ten
enumerated purposes which include:
(1) [to] promote the development of developing countries,
which often need temporary preferential advantages . ..;
(2) [to] promote the notion that trade, rather than aid, is a
more effective and cost efficient way of promoting...
development ... ;
(5) [to] encourage the providing of increased trade liberaliza-
tion measures ...;
(8) [to] integrate developing countries into the international
trading system with its attendant responsibility in a manner
commensurate with their development;
(9) [to] encourage developing countries-
(A) to eliminate or reduce significant barriers to trade . .26
This comment will examine the recent graduation of South Korea
from the GSP in terms of these particular goals of the program. The
economic benefits that Korea has obtained from this system as well as
the implications of the loss of these benefits must be analyzed to deter-
mine whether the graduation of Korea from the American GSP was a
necessary or useful act.
3. THE GRADUATION OF KOREA FROM THE U.S. GSP
South Korea graduated from the American GSP on January 2,
1989. The spectacular economic growth that Korea has achieved in
such a relatively short period of time is often considered to have moti-
vated this decision.27 An understanding of the size and strength of the
Korean and American industries affected by the GSP provides greater
:5 Id.
24 See infra notes 28 & 29 and accompanying text.
25 Renewal of the GSP, supra note 18, at 646 (emphasis omitted).
26 1984 Trade Act, supra note 17, at § 501.
2 See MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT, supra note 1.
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insight into the rationale for President Reagan's announcement of Jan-
uary 1988. Although the Reagan message focuses upon two principal
considerations to justify Korea's graduation, there are also other im-
plicit reasons for the cessation of these trade benefits. Examining each
of these factors is necessary to comprehend why Korea has graduated
from the GSP.
3.1. Facts: United States-South Korea Trade Relation
According to the March 1988 ABECOR 8 country report, Korea's
GDP per capita is US$2,361 (1986)."9 As its economy has experienced
rapid rates of economic growth, so too have its exports. In 1986, Ko-
rea's exports totaled US$33.9 billion and its trade surplus was US$4.2
billion. This was the first year that Korea enjoyed a trade surplus after
a relative balance in 1985 and deficits of US$1.8 billion and US$1.0
billion in 1983 and 1984, respectively. 0 Manufactured goods are a sig-
nificant part of the total. It has been reported that "[t]he share of man-
ufactured exports in total exports is about ... 85-100% in the case of
Hong Kong, South Korea and Taiwan."'" The apparently sudden eco-
nomic expansion of the Korean economy can be attributed to its imple-
mentation of a policy of export-propelled growth. In particular, begin-
ning in the 1960's, the Korean government emphasized "export
expansion in labor-intensive consumer nondurables. Because [this]
strategy offered the most rapid growth prospects consistent with Ko-
rea's comparative advantages in labor skills, the government chose to
follow that path." 2 This growth in labor intensive goods, however,
cannot continue indefinitely. In the late 1970's it was realized that,
"[e]ven though the labor force will continue to grow at the fairly high
rate of 2.7 percent a year during the 1980's, Korea's comparative ad-
vantage will start to shift from products intensive in labor to products
intensive in capital and skills."3" This is the economy of Korea: rapid
growth, labor intensive and dependent on exports. The United States is
also an important partner in the development of the Korean economy.
28 "ABECOR is an association of European banks seeking to improve the services
that each individual member is able to offer to its customers by developing banking and
financial objectives on the basis of mutual co-operation." BARCLAYS, ABECOR COUN-
TRY REPORT, SOUTH KOREA 1 (March 1988).
29 Id. This is an increase of 11.9% from 1985.
20 Id.
31 KRAUS & LOTKENHORST, supra note 10, at 23.
32 1. ADELMAN & S. ROBINSON, INCOME DISTRIBUTION POLICY IN DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES: A CASE STUDY OF KOREA 42-43 (1978).
1- P. HASAN & D.C. RAO, KOREA: POLICY ISSUES FOR LONG-TERM DEVELOP-
MENT 9 (1979).
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The United States has always played an active role in Korea's
economy. It is only recently that Korea has played a significant part in
the American economy as it has "emerged as the US' seventh largest
trade partner with a US$10 billion trade surplus in 1987.", 4 Only two
decades ago such a prediction would have been ridiculed. A dynamic
export policy and the liberalization of international trade as exempli-
fied by the Generalized System of Preferences, however, have contrib-
uted to Korea's amazing growth.
The American GSP has had only a limited effect on America's
domestic economy. 5 The specific articles covered by the program in-
clude sporting goods equipment, toys and other light manufactured
goods.38 Senator Robert Dole accurately described the program's role in
a hearing before the Subcommittee on International Trade. He stated
that "[s]ince its inception 10 years ago, the GSP has not played a large
role in terms of its coverage of total imports. Nevertheless, the program
clearly is of importance to our political relations with the third world,
and to their economic growth." 7 Examples of the economic growth to
which Senator Dole referred are the estimates of duties forgone through
the GSP. As of 1983, Hong Kong had "saved" $54.5 million, Taiwan,
$159.8 million, and Korea, $74.6 million.38 * These savings provided a
powerful incentive for the growth of industries affected by the removal
of tariffs. "In Korea [for example], the government noted that GSP has
stimulated small and medium-sized industries and has led to a dimin-
ished role for textiles and footwear in overall exports."3" The signifi-
cance of the GSP should not be overemphasized. It is a program of
limited size and limited applicability in the United States. Its impor-
tance to other countries such as Korea, however, is of a higher magni-
tude. The reasons for Korea's graduation must therefore be scrutinized
to ensure that the loss of these benefits is justified.
34 Chandra, Burdens of the Giant: Deficit and Defense, FAR E. ECON. REV.,
May 12, 1988, at 24.
35 Imports covered by GSP accounted for 4.9% of total nonpetroleum imports in
1981 and about 0.5% of U.S. consumption. See U.S. INT'L TRADE COMM'N, PUB. No.
1379, AN EVALUATION OF U.S. IMPORTS UNDER THE GENERALIZED SYSTEM OF
PREFERENCES, (1983) [hereinafter AN EVALUATION OF U.S. IMPORTS].
36 See generally id. for an evaluation and enumeration of eligible articles under
the United States' Generalized System of Preferences.
37 Renewal of the Generalized System of Preferences: Hearing Before the Sub-
comm. on Int'l Trade of the Senate Comm. on Finance, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1983)
(statement of Senator Dole) [hereinafter Senate Subcomm. Hearing on GSP].
38 Id. at 14 (statement of Ambassador Brock).
39 FIRST FIVE YEARS' OPERATION, supra note 12, at 35.
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3.2. The Reagan Message: Rationale for Graduation
President Reagan's message to the Congress on January 29, 1988
formally removed South Korea from the GSP.40 Officially, the factors
that led to this act were that Korea had "achieved an impressive level
of economic development and competitiveness, which could be sustained
without the preferences ' 41 and that other developing countries could
receive greater benefits from the program once Korea and others were
graduated. Congress was concerned that only seven recipient nations
42
received a significant majority of the GSP benefits. This disparity is the
primary factor which motivated Congress into enacting the 1984 Trade
Act.48 In order to integrate the developing countries into the interna-
tional trading system, a more equitable distribution of benefits is re-
quired. Congress may have feared that the continuation of the current
program with recipients like Korea would jeopardize one of the enu-
merated purposes of the program." Therefore, Korea's removal was
motivated, in part, by a desire to provide the least developed countries
(LDC's) with an opportunity to utilize GSP fully. Another important
factor pronounced in the presidential message was the economic
achievement of South Korea.
South Korea has undeniably demonstrated stupendous economic
growth.45 Whether it is sufficient to "graduate" it from the ranks of
developing nations to that of a developed nation is a subjective question
that is difficult to measure in terms of statistics. The use of "economic
achievement" as a criterion for graduation seems to signal a broader
congressional concern. Prior to the 1984 Trade Act there was an "un-
derlying congressional ... desire to force the NIC's to accept increased
independence, economic responsibility and political maturity within the
world trading system as an accompaniment to their increasing economic
and trade successes." '46 "Economic achievement" means that a nation is
deemed ready to enter the international trading system as a full mem-
ber and to receive the resulting advantages and disadvantages. Korea
has been categorized as such. The presidential message removing South
40 MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT, supra note 1.
41 Id.
42 See supra note 37, at 14-15 (statement of Ambassador Brock). The seven na-
tions are Taiwan, Korea, Hong Kong, Mexico, Brazil, Singapore and Israel.
" Renewal of the GSP, supra note 18, at 628.
44 See 1984 Trade Act, supra note 17, at § 501 (to integrate developing countries
into the international trading system).
45 See generally BARCLAYS, supra note 28 (real GDP growth from 1983 to 1987
increased 5.4-12.5% each year). See also Chandra, supra note 34 (emergence of South
Korea as a major trading partner, in terms of volume, with the United States).
46 Renewal of the GSP, supra note 18, at 629.
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Korea from GSP was relatively brief and only referred to the two fac-
tors previously discussed. There are other factors which were consid-
ered in removing the trade benefits.
3.3. Other Arguments in Favor of Graduation
The GSP was intended to be a temporary program based upon a
limited legal obligation. It was also designed to encourage developing
nations to reduce and then to eliminate their trade barriers. Invocation
of these two principles provides additional evidence of the motive for
the graduation of Korea from the American GSP.
The temporary nature of the GSP is explicitly expressed in the
Generalized System of Preferences Renewal Act of 1984."' Even prior
to enactment of this legislation the GSP was viewed similarly. In a
Senate hearing during August 1983, William Brock stated that "[a]s
initially conceived, GSP systems were to be ... temporary, unilateral
grants of preferences by developed countries to developing countries.' 8
In addition, "during the... Tokyo Round of Multilateral Trade Ne-
gotiations (MTN) the United States maintained that the GSP was a
temporary, non-reciprocal program."' 9 The 1984 Act merely codified a
widely accepted principle. Finally, the principle of graduation itself
suggests the limited scope and duration of GSP. "Graduation ... em-
phasizes that GSP benefits are temporary and reminds LDC's that they
must someday become mature members of the international trading sys-
tem."5 As a result of the temporary nature of the preferences, devel-
oped nations consider their legal obligations to recipients as limited.
The legal obligations associated with international treaties, agree-
ments, and resolutions vary considerably. Treaties often include more
defined legal obligations. "It is generally recognized that recommenda-
tions and resolutions are not legally binding on states in the sense of an
international treaty or convention."51 The legal obligations associated
with the GSP were apparently pronounced at UNCTAD I.
[T]he developed countries are not legally obligated to
grant such preferences to the developing countries. They
have clearly indicated in the "Agreed Conclusions" that they
7 1984 Trade Act, supra note 17, at § 501.
48 Senate Subcomm. Hearing on GSP, supra note 37, at 6 (statement of Ambassa-
dor Brock).
49 FIRST FIVE YEARS' OPERATION, supra note 12, at 3.
90 Renewal of the GSP, supra note 18, at 646.
5' YUSUF, supra note 4, at 77. See also Sei Fujii v. State, 38 Cal. 2d 718, 242
P.2d 617 (1952) (The general purposes and objectives of the United Nations Organiza-
tion do not purport to impose legal obligations on the individual member nations).
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did not accept such a legal obligation. Their attitude in sub-
sequent negotiations, and in particular in the recently con-
cluded Tokyo Round MTNs, confirms their reluctance to
provide a contractual basis for their preferential relationship
with the developing countries".52
Considering the lack of a definitive legal obligation and the explic-
itly expressed temporary nature of the preferences, the graduation of
Korea does not appear to infringe upon or violate any specific legal
principles. The graduation, however, may adversely affect the trade re-
lationship between the United States and Korea.
The current United States-South Korea trade relationship has
been affected by the perception that Korea is maintaining unacceptable
barriers to its markets and is not fulfilling the responsibilities of a more
developed nation. 3 For example, this frustration with Korean policies
is illustrated by "the initiation of investigations under section 301 of the
1974 Trade Act, which allows retaliatory measures to be taken if un-
fair trade practices are found, such as those said to be affecting beef
and tobacco."' 54 An example of Korean policy that restricts access for
American producers, among others, is the concept of a "Free Export
Zone." 5
A Free Export Zone is a specifically designated industrial area
where foreign-invested enterprises can freely import raw materials or
semi-finished goods free of duty, and manufacture, process, or assemble
export products. Qualification for admission into the zone is based
upon the applicant's ability to show that all of the products will be
exported and that they will contribute to technological improvement
and increased employment.5"
American frustration with policies of this sort has made it politi-
cally difficult for the United States to continue to offer trade benefits to
a nation that imposes restrictions on American exports. The pervading
opinion is that a more advanced country such as Korea should show
52 YUSUF, supra note 4, at 96. (See Agreed Conclusions of the Special Committee
on Preferences 6, UNCTAD, Doc. TD/B/330.)
53 See generally Jordan & Taylor, Cut U.S. Troops in Korea Now, N.Y. Times,
Dec. 2, 1988, at A31 (op-ed) (disagreement in the trade dialogue needs to be contained
and addressed); Jameson, May Callfor Troop Reductions, L.A. Times, Nov. 6, 1988,
at 1 (referring to South Korea's ascendancy to the upper ranks of industrializing
countries).
51 Making a Beef about Smokes, FAR E. ECON. REV., May 12, 1988, at 25.
55 Free Export Zone Establishment Law, Law No. 2180 of 1970, as last
amended by Law No. 3338 of 1980, art. 2.
56 Kim, Legal Aspects of Doing Business in Korea, BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS
WITH CHINA, JAPAN & SouTH KOREA § 10.03(3) (1983).
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"some willingness to open up and allow trade to flow in both ways. ') 57
Unfortunately, Korea did not heed this warning.
The American outrage was fueled by a presidential campaign
commercial questioning why "a US $10,000 Chrysler K [model] car
costs US $48,000 in [South] Korea.""8 People questioned how we could
give a nation such favorable treatment when it had a US$10 billion
trade surplus with the United States.59
The average American was unconcerned with the purposes enu-
merated in the 1984 Renewal Act. The images presented by the media
of foreigners taking advantage of Americans led to an outraged public.
The Congress and the President have been affected by this emotionally
charged issue.6" Korea's graduation from the American GSP is a vivid
illustration. There is substantial justification for Korea's graduation as
demonstrated by the above analysis. The harmful effects of graduation,
however, are rarely discussed. The significance of these effects leads to
the question of whether graduation is an appropriate response to the
situation.
4. WAS GRADUATION THE APPROPRIATE RESPONSE?
Korea's graduation from GSP will affect American producers, im-
porters, and consumers. Korea's economy will not be immune from the
impact of this event. The only nations, unfortunately, which will not be
affected by this event are the LDC's which the President hoped would
now be able "to benefit more fully from the GSP program."'" The
unfavorable effects on America, Korea, and other nations suggest that
"graduation" was an inappropriate action.
5 Senate Subcomm. Hearing on GSP, supra note 37, at 5.
58 Chandra, supra note 34, at 24 (statement of Richard Gephardt). See also
Rasky, Gephardt's Iowa Campaign Resurges, N.Y. Times, Jan. 19, 1988, at B7. But
see Scherer, Case of the $48,000 K-car; Critics say Gephardt's Figures Don't Add Up,
Christian Science Monitor, Feb. 22, 1988, at 32 (arguing that the price of the K-car in
South Korea would be US $30,451 and not US $48,000). The significance of the dis-
crepancy in the price of the K-car is that the media and public were quickly enraged by
the disclosure of the original "statistic." Even if the validity of this figure were subse-
quently disproved, many of the detrimental effects could not be easily altered.
C' handra, supra note 34, at 24.
o See generally id. See also The Trade Bill Fluffs its Feathers, THE ECONO-
MIST, March 19, 1988, at 21; Remove the Trade-Bill Shackles, N.Y. Times, March 17,
1988, at A30 (Richard Gephardt's amendment to the Trade Bill generating much pub-
lic passion).
01 MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT, supra note 1.
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4.1. Effects upon the United States: Importers, Consumers and
Producers
A House hearing on August 4, 1983 emphasized that American
trade relations with the leading "GSP graduation candidates" were not
one-sided. "In 1982 the GSP's top seven beneficiaries purchased over
$30 billion of United States exports, representing 45 percent of United
States exports to all beneficiary countries and 15 percent of global
United States exports." It was also stated that "[tihe GSP treatment
accorded to leading beneficiaries is strongly supported by U.S. consum-
ers, importers and many U.S. producers." 2 Each group has benefitted
from the GSP. The economic advantages that each group received will
be analyzed in the following subsections.
4.1.1. Importers
Importers in the United States, as in other countries, must apprise
themselves of newly enacted legislation that may affect the entry into
the United States of the goods they buy and sell.63 The GSP has elimi-
nated or reduced tariffs which the importer would have otherwise had
to pay directly or indirectly. It is a rudimentary economic concept that
individuals seek minimal costs to generate the maximum economic
profits possible. "Manufacturers in Taiwan, Korea and Hong Kong
sell products [eligible for GSP benefits] at significantly lower costs than
their American counterparts. '"6 Therefore, common business sense jus-
tifies the importer's rationale for purchasing these articles at a lower
cost. The utilization of tariffs, however, distorts the cost of the imported
good65 and eliminates the comparative advantage that the exporting na-
tion has with respect to that particular good. The GSP has eliminated
this distortion of trade and permitted importers to obtain a larger profit
than they would have realized without the program. The removal of
the trade benefits on these goods will afford American importers a
lower profit margin as their costs increase.66 It is likely that these
62 Senate Subcomm. Hearing on GSP, supra note 37, at 19.
62 See generally DIRECTORY OF UNITED STATES IMPORTERS, 1988 J. COMM.
(lists and describes various laws and regulations, including GSP, which may affect an
importer).
" Webster & Bussert, The Revised Generalized System of Preferences: "Instant
Replay" or a Real Change?, 6 Nw. J. INT'L L. Bus. 1035 (1984).
62 See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
66 See generally id. This analysis assumes that either of two scenarios occurs.
One, the importer will seek to obtain the same profit for each good sold whether or not
there is a tariff. If a tariff is levied, then a higher price will be charged to the con-
sumer. Consumer demand will decrease in response to the higher price and the im-
porter's net profits will decrease. Two, the importer charges the consumer the same
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higher costs will be passed on to the American consumer. This conclu-
sion is based upon the assumption that American importers will con-
tinue to buy from Korean suppliers. There is the possibility, however,
that these importers will look to other markets for these goods. This
issue will be discussed later in this article.
67
4.1.2. Consumers
The individual consumer is often the ultimate destination of goods.
The price paid by the consumer consists of all costs that were expended
for the good to reach the store, including tariffs. Thus, the consumer
benefits under the GSP. "Lower overall manufacturing costs achieved
by business utilizing GSP parts and components benefitted consumers
by lowering prices.""8 Although the number of products affected by
GSP are relatively limited, United States consumers pay for any pro-
tectionist measures. For example, "[a] recent study by ... the Institute
for International Economics estimated that car quotas raised prices for
Americans by more than $5 billion a year. Orange-juice tariffs cost
consumers more than $500 million a year."69 In summary, the removal
of trade barriers such as tariffs is often beneficial to consumers as the
artificial price is lowered to a level more representative of its actual cost
of production.
4.1.3. Producers/Manufacturers
This section will examine the effects of the GSP upon two distinct
groups of producers/manufacturers in the United States. First are those
producers that integrate GSP eligible goods into a new "product"
which is subsequently sold by the producer. These producers, not sur-
prisingly, have been staunch supporters of the program. Second, are
those producers that manufacture goods domestically that are also listed
as GSP-eligible. These producers compete against the "cheap imports"
and vehemently oppose the GSP as it affects their particular industry.
The costs and benefits of the GSP to each of these producers should be
weighed in determining the overall impact upon American
manufacturers.
Major beneficiaries of GSP have been producers utilizing a partic-
ular article as a part of its "product." "[M]ost domestic producers, in-
price whether or not a tariff is levied. The total volume of goods sold will be un-
changed, but the profit for each item sold will be lower and net profit will decrease.
67 See infra notes 86-101 and accompanying text.
66 Webster & Bussert, supra note 64, at 1048.
69 Protectionists in Glass Houses, THE ECONOMIST, April 30, 1988, at 20.
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cluding all the major firms, import to some extent, . .. [including] the
importation of certain lines or parts .... ,,70 The domestic producer is
able to take advantage of lower costs and improve his profit margin. A
representative of the American Association of Exports and Imports de-
scribed the effect of the GSP on domestic producers: "The GSP has
helped American industry meet intense foreign competition, both at
home in the U.S. and on world markets, by producing less expensive
parts and materials from the beneficiary countries for incorporating
into U.S. manufactured products. 7' Although a significant number of
domestic producers have benefitted from GSP, many others, facing
cheaper imports, have not fared as well.
Domestic manufacturers that produce GSP-eligible goods have
been injured by the removal of tariffs. The degree of injury, however,
has varied by industry. An analysis of a number of industries illustrates
the misconceptions concerning GSP and its effect on United States'
businesses. The jewelry industry, for example, illustrates the steady de-
cline of domestic manufacturers. Imports' share of the precious metal
jewelry market has increased from 4.2% in 1972 to an estimated 33.5%
in 1986 and their share of the costume jewelry market has risen from
10.4% to 31.3% during the same period.7 1 "The key reason for these
increased imports has been lowering of tariff barriers." 73 The lowering
of these barriers can be attributed to the GSP as well as other agree-
ments including the implementation of the Caribbean Basin Economic
Recovery Act 4 and the United States-Israel Free Trade Area Imple-
mentation Act.75 Thus the actual harm that GSP has inflicted upon
this area is not as extensive as a cursory examination of the statistics
would reveal. Domestic jewelry manufacturers have lost a substantial
portion of the domestic market. The graduation of Korea, Taiwan and
Hong Kong from the GSP, however, will not significantly alter this
decline. As a result of Korea's graduation, other nations which have a
comparative advantage in producing jewelry that are not subject to tar-
iffs will capture an even larger share of the U.S. market. Limiting the
scope and the reach of the GSP will not significantly protect domestic
"0 U.S. INT'L TRADE COMM'N, PUB. No. 841, Toys, GAMES AND WHEEL
GOODS, 87 (1983).
7' Hearings on S. 1718, reprinted in Webster & Bussert, supra note 64, at 1048
n.73.
72 U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, 1987 U.S. INDUSTRIAL OUTLOOK 45-2.
73 Id.
74 Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act, Pub. L. No. 98-67, 97 Stat. 384
(1983).
11 United States-Israel Free Trade Area Implementation Act of 1985, Pub. L. No.
99-47, 99 Stat. 82.
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producers from other foreign producers that can manufacture a good
more efficiently and inexpensively. It is probable that other developed
nations will capture parts of the United States market that are relin-
quished by higher priced Korean goods. The sporting goods industry
illustrates this proposition.
Korea, as well as Taiwan, has received duty-free treatment under
the GSP 71 on various types of recreation equipment, another United
States industry encountering *an increasing number of imported items.
"For the last fifteen years the United States has had a trade deficit in
sporting goods. The trade deficit grew from $47 million in 1972 to an
estimated $1 billion in 1986, and a deficit of more than $1.1 billion is
forecast for 1987." 77 The cessation of GSP benefits to Korea and Tai-
wan could arguably halt this decline. An examination of the compara-
tive shares of world trade, however, illustrates that the rise in imports
into the U.S. corresponds to shifts in global trade patterns. From 1975
to 1985, the percent shares of world trade in sporting goods have
changed as follows: U.S., 17.4% to 8.6%; Taiwan, 6.5% to 25.8%;
South Korea, 2.7% to 9.0%; Japan, 10.9% to 10.6% West Germany,
5.1% to 4.9%.78 If the NIC's portion of the market declines, Japan and
West Germany would appear to be in the best position to capture a
larger share of the United States market since they currently possess
the necessary industrial infrastructure. It is unlikely that a nation with-
out the appropriate infrastructure would be able to reap the benefits of
such a potentially profitable market."9 The domestic manufacturers
may be able-to recapture a portion of the domestic market, though the
evidence is inconclusive. The developing countries, however, will not
benefit from the graduation becadise they lack the facilities to begin pro-
duction of these desired goods.
4.1.4. Summary
The International Trade Commission Reports provide useful in-
formation concerning the economic impact of the GSP on the American
and recipient nations' economies. "ITC data indicate that GSP imports
constitute a significant amount of trade incentive without being overly
burdensome to domestic producers . . . . [Tjhe ITC study concluded
that during the last several years the scope of GSP trade has [also] been
substantial enough to act as a development incentive.""0 The conclusion
" See AN EVALUATION OF U.S. IMPORTS, supra note 35.
71 U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, 1987 U.S. INDUSTRIAL OUTLOOK 46-11.
78 Id. at 46-12.
" See infra notes 86-101 and accompanying text.
80 Renewal of the GSP, supra note 18, at 635.
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reached by the ITC comports with the previous analysis. The benefits
to importers, consumers and producers in the United States as a result
of GSP outweigh its potential costs. Korea should not have been gradu-
ated from the American GSP.
4.2. Effects upon Korea
The impact upon Korea of Korea's graduation from the American
GSP must be examined on two distinct levels. First, there is the effect
of graduation upon a potential shift of Korea from a labor-intensive to
a high-technology based economy. The second level of impact is the
effect of graduation upon Korea's bilateral relationship with the United
States. The domestic and international effects of Korea's graduation
from the American GSP clarify the implications of pursuing such a
policy.
The precise loss of sales from formerly eligible GSP articles is dif-
ficult to calculate. Generally, the production of such goods will decrease
and be less desirable than when GSP was in effect. Korea's compara-
tive advantage will be reduced.8" As a result, there will be a further
shifting away from such less profitable labor-intensive industries.8" The
Korean government has played a pivotal role in this shift. "To further
promote the rapid economic development of Korea and enhance inter-
national competitiveness of Korean industry, the government ... is ac-
tively promoting increased inducement of foreign technology"8 through
long license terms and higher royalty rates. This policy may explain
the Korean government's failure to protest forcefully its graduation
from the GSP. The January announcement will merely quicken the
process that pushes Korea into higher technology industries, thereby
permitting other developing nations to establish significant labor-inten-
s' See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
s See P. HASAN & D.C. RAO, supra note 33.
Jones, Licensing in Korea, BUSINEss TRANSACTIONS WITH CHINA, JAPAN &
SoUTH KOREA § 11.06 (1983). See International Trade Act, Law No. 3895 (Korean
Legal Center) (Dec. 31, 1986) (Article 3. (Measure for Promoting Trade) The Minis-
ter of Commerce and Industry may take measures to increase continuously exportation
or importation of goods pursuant to a Presidential Decree as he deems necessary to
promote trade); Industrial Development Act, Law No. 3806 (Korean Legal Center)
(Jan. 8, 1986). The Industrial Development Act authorizes the government to devise
the following policies- 1. Elevation of industrial technology and productivity; 2. Effec-
tive development and utilization of resources; 3. Training and effective management of
human resources; and 4. Expansion of the base for industrial development. Further-
more, Article 17 provides that the government shall establish an Industrial Develop-
ment Fund in order to secure the financial resources necessary for promoting balanced
development and nationalization of industry. These are only two examples of the inte-
gral role the government has played and continues to play in the development of the
Korean economic structure.
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sive industries. The likelihood of this occurring will be analyzed in the
next subsection.
The removal of GSP benefits will affect the United States- South
Korea relationship in two ways. First, it will be more strained and
fragile. "Not since ... Carter threatened to pull out American troops
more than a decade ago have U.S.-South Korean relations in trade,
security and culture been so uncertain or so emotionally charged."'"
The removal of GSP benefits represents the symbolic disunity of the
nations. Second, the removal of GSP benefits eliminates an American
bargaining chip to convince Korea to lower trade barriers and impose
stricter copyright laws. 5 In the past, Korea was encouraged to consider
American concerns through such economic persuasion. The removal of
the benefits eliminates this incentive.
As this discussion suggests, it is difficult to measure the objective
and subjective costs of GSP removal. The United States-South Korea
relationship will experience changes. Whether these changes will be for
the better is unclear.
4.3. Impact Upon LDC's and other Developing Nations
A rationale for the graduation of the four NICs was that it might
"enable other less developed countries to benefit more fully from the
GSP program."8" Unfortunately, this aspiration contradicts conclusions
made by Senate Hearings in 198387 and the message transmitted by the
President to the United States Congress in 1980.88 This subsection will
first focus on the feasibility of other developing nations benefitting from
the graduation of the NIC's. Second, international concerns and reac-
tions to the graduation will be examined. Finally, the potential effects
of these reactions upon United States trade relations will also be
analyzed.
Although a major recipient of GSP has never previously graduated
from the American GSP, the effects of "selective graduation" present
an accurate measure of what is to be expected upon the complete grad-
uation of a country. In the Presidential message of 1980, it was stated
that "[w]hile the competitive need limits have graduated major benefi-
ciaries from receiving duty-free treatment for a large share of their eli-
gible trade, these limits to date have not resulted in a wider distribution
84 Clifford, Little Buddy Grows Up, FAR E. ECON. REv., May 12, 1988, at 19.
85 These topics are beyond the scope of this article. See generally Chang, Guide to
Protecting Trademarks in Korea, 82 PAT. & TRADEMARK REV. 412-29 (1984).
8' MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT, supra note 1.
8"7 Senate Subcomm. Hearing on GSP, supra note 37 (statement of William
Brock).
88 See FIRST FivE YEARS' OPERATION, supra note 12.
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of GSP benefits among developing countries."89 It was admitted that
for a country to utilize the United States GSP program, "it must be far
enough along the development path to have a fairly well-developed in-
frastructure and productive capacity in the manufactures that
predominate the U.S. scheme." 90 The International Trade Commission
supported this argument when it declared that "many LDC's lack the
essential infrastructure, capital and skilled labor necessary to utilize ef-
fectively manufacturing opportunities offered by the GSP."91 Thus the
LDC's, especially in the short-run, would be unable to significantly
increase their portion of the program's benefits due to the graduation of
the NIC's. The LDC's lack the appropriate infrastructure and econo-
mies of scale necessary for these industries to be sufficiently profitable
at the present time. Graduation will not lead to redistribution.
Other GSP recipients must consider the implications of Korea's
graduation. Although Korea's trade barriers were not officially cited as
the reason for its graduation, other nations may interpret this as retali-
atory act. For example:
The implications of the U.S. GSP action worry both
Thailand and Indonesia. While continuing Thai status
hinges on it enacting copyright legislation, Indonesia's bene-
fit depends upon a U.S. decision on a petition against lack of
labour rights brought by the American Federation of Labour
and Congress of Industrial Organizations.92
In addition to these specific concerns, there is a general feeling
that a breach of good faith has occurred. "The withdrawal of the ad-
vantages enjoyed by the developing States under the GSP by a prefer-
ence-giving country would constitute a breach of the principle of good
faith, which is a cornerstone of international law."9 " Developing na-
tions are concerned that the graduation of the NIC's is only the begin-
ning of a trend of restricting imports into developed nations' markets.
They seek freer trade and not protectionist threats.
The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development Re-
port of 1984"' illustrates the concerns that various developing nations
possess:
:9 Id.
90 Id. at X.
9 Renewal of the GSP, supra note 18, at 636.
92 Chandler, Communication Breakdown, FAR E. EcON. REV., Feb. 25, 1988, at
14.
, YUSUF, supra note 4, at 115.
" 28 U.N. TDBOR Supp. (No. 1A), U.N. Doc. TD/B/997 (1985).
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The representative of India recalled that the developed
countries had committed themselves in 1983 to halting and
reversing protectionism; yet there had been increased protec-
tionism .... Exports of developing countries in a number of
sectors in which they gained competitive advantage had come
under one or the other form of protectionist regulation...
[and this] contributed to the erosion of confidence in the in-
ternational trading system. 5
The representative from Malaysia reiterated his country's support of
free trade, but questioned the intensification of protectionist measures,
especially in North America. 8 He explained how his nation "had a
comparative advantage in a variety of products. Unfortunately, those
products could not be exported or even produced, as markets were
closed to them even before they had a chance to enter."'97 Finally, he
warned that "protectionism had serious repercussions, not only on
trade, but also on economic, social and political systems as a whole.""8
Government officials as well as manufacturers in the United States
must consider the implications of United State trade measures upon
these other spheres of international relations.
The concerns voiced by the Malaysian representative at the Trade
and Development Conference should not be dismissed. "The ASEAN 9
countries are of great political and strategic importance in themselves
because they straddle crucial sea-lanes and are neighbors of troubled
Indochina .... Thus U.S. economic policy for ASEAN has an impor-
tant political and strategic dimension."'10 Developing nations are con-
cerned with the protectionist measures implemented by the United
States. Their displeasure will affect their willingness to eliminate their
own trade barriers. This action will harm exporters from the United
States who will be unable to penetrate those markets. Furthermore, the
deterioration in trade relations will affect other facets of international
relations.
9 Id. at 48.
" Id. at 52.
97 Id. at 53.
98 Id.
9' The Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) was formed in August
1967 by Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, the Phillipines and Singapore. The association
was established to promote cooperation, economic growth, social progress and stability
in the region. The principal instruments of ASEAN are the ASEAN Declaration of
1967 and the Agreement, Declaration and Treaty signed in 1976. See Singapore and
International Law, 19 MALAYA L. REv. 401, 407-31 for the texts of the ASEAN
Declaration of August 8, 1967, and various ASEAN treaties and instruments.
100 L. NIKSCH, THE ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIA NATIONS (ASEAN): AN
EMERGING CHALLENGE IN U.S. POLICY TOWARDS ASIA 68 (1978).
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The general implication is that other nations will be less interested
in discussing with the United States issues such as free international
trade and other concerns of the United States. Cooperation would be
replaced by confrontation and the goal of integrating the developing
countries into the international economy'' would fail miserably. This
is not the path that we should follow.
5. CONCLUSIONS
An examination of the purposes of the Generalized System of
Preferences °2 and the reasons enumerated in the Presidential message
which formally removed South Korea from the GSP'0 3 show that the
graduation was not an appropriate response to the situation. It is not
denied that South Korea is within a classification distinct from the "de-
veloping nations." South Korea, however, is not a completely developed
nation. Rather, it is currently in a transitional stage. The removal of
GSP benefits may only affect a small part of Korea's trade, in an area
of the economy that has been predicted to decline. What is wrong with
simply accelerating the process?
The problem with such a rationale is that it is too narrow and
only focuses on the short-term. It eliminates benefits for particular
goods and particular countries with the vague hope that the nations
that truly need the assistance will be able to develop the appropriate
industries in a short period of time. Simultaneously, the NIC's are con-
gratulated for their stupendous economic growth and are welcomed into
the international economic community as "equal members." Unfortu-
nately, the NIC's are still inferior economically relative to the devel-
oped nations of the world. There is a better policy.
Korea and the other NIC's could assist the LDC's to build infra-
structures that would be conducive to receiving benefits under GSP.
Perhaps Korea could utilize the labor-intensive resources of other coun-
tries at a time when its own population and economy can be classified
as less labor-intensive. Just as the United States was able to take ad-
vantage of lower labor costs in Korea in the late 1970's and early
1980's, so too could Korea. Korean investment in such projects would
supply the necessary capital. If Korea agrees to provide such assistance,
the United States should reinstate certain GSP benefits to South Korea.
As Korea continues its growth, it will eventually be phased out of the
GSP.
.01 See 1984 Trade Act, supra note 17.
102 Id.
10I See MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT, supra note 1.
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Korea's graduation from the GSP should have been delayed until
Korea was better developed and the LDC's learned to utilize better the
GSP programs of the United States and other industrialized nations. A
transitory stage between "beneficiary" and "graduate" of GSP is neces-
sary. This transitory stage should include characteristics of both catego-
ries. It should fulfill the goal of integrating all developing nations into
the international economic system. It should strengthen the ideals of
free trade. This would allow more economically secure nations to help
other nations less fortunate to the degree that they are able. The global
economic order that will be most beneficial to the United States is one
free from barriers and obstacles. We must, therefore, be its most vocal
supporter. "Implementing protectionist legislation or free trade legisla-
tion in a protectionist fashion will not provide developed countries with
a solution to limited growth. Rather, the solution lies in open, fair, and
free trade."' 4
1" Hackney & Shafer, Protectionism and Developing Countries: The Impact On
Trade and Debt, 23 STAN. J. INT'L L. 203, 231 (1987).
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